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THE IMPLICATIONS OF JOTA v. TEXACO
AND THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS
Peggy Rodgers Kalast
This article examines the detrimental effects of transna-
tional corporations ("TNCs") in developing countries in the con-
text of oil exploration and exploitation in Ecuador, and the
problems of holding such corporations accountable for environ-
mental impacts caused by their operations. In the case of Ecua-
dor, the physical and cultural survival of indigenous people is
threatened by the environmental contamination caused by oil
exploration and colonization of indigenous peoples' land. In
three separate but related actions, residents of the Oriente re-
gion of Ecuador and Peru have brought class action suits
against Texaco in the courts of the United States seeking relief
for vast devastation to that region caused by decades of oil ex-
ploration and extraction activities of an oil consortium. These
cases raise important issues concerning the appropriateness of
a United States forum for litigation in which a foreign govern-
ment is significantly interested, and the availability of a forum
for foreign plaintiffs that have been harmed by multinational
corporations. Until recently, indigenous people and other
groups similarly harmed by detrimental corporate practices
have been repeatedly rejected from adjudication in U.S. courts.
By reversing a District Court decision dismissing the case, the
recent ruling by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Jota v.
Texaco, Inc. potentially opens the door for individuals harmed
by transnational corporate actions seeking a forum in U.S.
courts.
t LL.M., New York University School of Law, 1999; J.D., University of Mary-
land School of Law, 1991; B.B.A, University of Notre Dame, 1984. Ms. Kalas prac-
tices environmental law in New York and Washington, D.C. The author is grateful
to Professor Benedict Kingsbury for his suggestions and valuable insights on this
topic.
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Part I of this article examines human rights violations by
transnational corporations through events that occurred in re-
lation to the Huaoroni tribe in Ecuador. Part II analyzes cases
brought in the United States by the Huaorani people and other
indigenous groups against Texaco. Part III looks at the extent
TNCs have been held accountable for environmental degrada-
tion and human rights violations, and examines the evolving
recognition of the right to a healthy environment within inter-
national human rights law. Part IV concludes that the recogni-
tion of a fundamental right to a healthy environment as
customary international law would have positive ramifications
on the ways TNCs conduct their international operations. In
the absence of a universal code of conduct for corporations, or an
international treaty which extends justiciable environmental
rights to individuals, "home" countries of TNCs have an obliga-
tion to provide a forum for injured parties, as it may be the only
means of redress for tortious conduct by multinational
corporations.
I. BACKGROUND
Ecuador turned to oil production in the Oriente for its ma-
jor source of income over twenty years ago.1 The initial explora-
tion for oil was undertaken in 1964 by a Texaco subsidiary
("TexPet") pursuant to a concession agreement with the Repub-
lic of Ecuador. Further exploration between 1965 and 1973 by a
joint Texaco-Gulf consortium led to discovery of substantial oil
reserves. In 1974, with the start of large-scale extraction, Pe-
troecuador 2 acquired a twenty-five percent interest in the con-
sortium, which was increased to sixty-five and one-half percent
in 1976 when Petroecuador acquired Gulfs share. 3 Thus, from
the early 1970s until 1990, Texaco sent approximately 1.4 bil-
l See ADRIANA FABRA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION,
AND HuMAN RIGHTS: A CASE STUDY in Human Rights Approaches To Environmen-
tal Protection 245 (Alan Boyle & Michael Anderson eds., 1996).
2 Petroecuador is a company wholly owned by the Government of Ecuador. In
1992, Petroecuador acquired 100% ownership of the consortium, after which time
Texaco was no longer involved. Petroecuador now manages oil production in the
Oriente in a consortia with international oil companies.
3 See Victoria C. Arthaud, Environmental Destruction in the Amazon: Can
U.S. Courts Provide a Forum for the Claims of Indigenous Peoples?, 7 GEO. INT'L
ENVTL. L. REV. 195, 198 & n. 17 (1994).
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lion barrels of oil through the Trans-Ecuadoran Pipeline, 312
miles from the Oriente region to the Pacific Coast.4 Over the
years, pipeline ruptures resulted in an estimated 16.8 million
gallons of crude oil to spill into the Oriente environment.5
The Ecuadoran government grants foreign companies
rights to exploit large blocks of the Oriente for oil once the com-
panies have found commercial quantities of oil in the block. 6 To-
day, oil exports represent almost half of Ecuador's total export
earnings. 7 Nevertheless, the oil development policies of the
Ecuadoran government have not been beneficial to overall eco-
nomic development. In 1970, before the oil boom, Ecuador's na-
tional debt stood at less than $300 million. Twenty years and
many oil companies later, Ecuador had a national debt of more
than $12 billion.8
A. Effects on the Environment
The detrimental results from oil exploration extend beyond
the Oriente region to the global community. Tropical forests
cover over fourteen percent of the land surface yet they hold at
least half of the world's species, most of which have neither
been studied or named.9 The Oriente is one of the richest bio-
logical treasures in the world, containing 9,000 to 12,000 spe-
cies of plants (roughly five percent of all plant species on
earth). 0 At least 1,300 plant species are used mostly for medi-
cal purposes by the forest people of Amazonia." Many of the
indigenous plants in the rainforest have the potential of con-
4 Id.
5 See id.
6 See Jennifer Brady, The Huaorani Tribe of Ecuador: A Study in Self-Deter-
mination for Indigenous Peoples, 10 HARv. HUM. RTs. J. 291, 293 n. 7 (1997).
7 See id.
8 Joe Kane, SAVAGES, excerpted in the SAN FRANcIsco EXAMINER, Oct. 29,
1995, at M-12. The production of oil turned into a vicious cycle as Ecuador had no
choice but to continue to produce oil quickly and cheaply. See Id.
9 World Wildlife Fund, The Importance of Biological Diversity at 9, provided
in Plaintiff's Supplemental Submission Regarding Global Effects of Ecuadoran En-
vironmental Destruction in Further Opposition to Texaco Inc.'s Motions to Dismiss
(1994) (Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc.) [hereinafter Plaintiffs Supplemental
Submission].
10 Joe Kane, Letter From The Amazon: With Spears From All Sides, THE NEW
YORKER, Sept. 27, 1993, at 59.
11 See id. at 15.
2000]
3
PACE INT'L L. REV.
taining anti-cancer properties. 12 In the United States, about
twenty-five percent of the prescribed drugs are derived from
tropical rainforest plants. 13 Other negative effects from oil ex-
ploration include massive deforestation as a result of road con-
struction.1 4 The clearing and burning of the rainforest
diminishes rainfall there and releases vast amounts of green-
house gases, thereby contributing to global warming.1 5 Oil
slicks in pits are often set on fire and burn for hours, resulting
in plumes of black smoke. These emissions leave residue on
vegetation, animals and water. They also cause skin rashes to
develop on children and contain nitrogen, sulfur, carbon, heavy
metals and hydrocarbons, many of which are toxic. 16
B. Effects on Indigenous Peoples
Nearly forty percent of Ecuador's eleven million residents
are indigenous, belonging to about eight ethnic groups.17 The
Amazon basin, also known as the Oriente, represents almost
half of Ecuador's total territory, and is home to 350,000 to
500,000 people, of whom twenty-five to fifty percent are indige-
nous.18 Of all the indigenous peoples in Ecuador, the Huaorani
are the most vulnerable to oil development.' 9 The Huaorani
12 See "Tropical Deforestation," Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Inter-
national Organizations, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1 (1980), ("some scientists believe
that seventy percent of the plants that possess anticancer properties live in tropi-
cal moist forests."); See also Rainforest Action Network, Fact Sheet No. 10B (1993)
(approximately 7,000 medical compounds prescribed by Western doctors are de-
rived from plants; in 1985, these had an estimated retail value of U.S. $43 billion),
provided in Tab 4 of Plaintiffs Supplemental Submission, supra note 9.
13 See CHRIS PARK, TROPICAL RAINFORESTS 89 (1992).
14 See JUDITH KIMERLING, AMAZON CRUDE 75 (NRDC 1992) [hereinafter AMA-
ZON CRUDE] ([r]oad construction by oil companies is the primary engine of defor-
estation in the Oriente"). In order to lay pipelines, oil companies build networks of
road throughout the region.
15 See Rainforest Action Network, Fact Sheet No. 12 (1993); Plaintiffs Supple-
mental Submission, supra note 12. Releases of greenhouse gases may cause cli-
matic changes that lead to desertification and sea level rises.
16 See AMAZoN CRUDE, supra note 14, at 67.
17 See Fabra, supra note 1, citing Confederacion de Nacionalidades Indigenas
del Ecuador (CONAIE)(February 1991).
18 See AMAZON CRUDE, supra note 14.
19 A number of articles have addressed the plight of the Huaoroni people in
relation to oil development in Ecuador. See Judith Kimerling, Disregarding Envi-
ronmental Law: Petroleum Development in Protected Natrual Areas and Indige-
nous Homelands in the Ecuadoran Amazon, 14 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
849 (1991); Judith Kimerling, The Environmental Audit of Texaco'sAmazon Oil
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number only approximately 1,200 people in seventeen dispersed
communities, and have very limited contact to the outside
world. Traditionally, they have depended upon the land for
their subsistence, and remain primarily hunters and gatherers.
Yet, despite the influence of missionaries and oil companies,
they have preserved their culture. Negative effects on the
Huaoroni due to oil development include lack of potable water
resulting from frequent oil spills and groundwater contamina-
tion,20 hunting game driven away by noise, intensive motor boat
river traffic, and numerous health concerns, including skin
rashes, pre-cancerous growths, stomach problems, chronic
headaches and fever. 21 Alcoholism and prostitution have been
introduced into the Huaorani society as a result of the Huaorani
working for the oil companies. 22 Witnesses have reported that
there have been confidential attempts by government and oil
companies to "exterminate" non-civilized Huaorani. 23 In addi-
tion, the oil companies fail to bring new jobs into the region be-
cause they bring in their work force from other regions or
countries, thus they only provide temporary positions to the lo-
cal, affected communities. 24
II. THE CASES: SEQUIHUA, AGUINDA AND JOTA
A total of three separate but related class action suits have
been brought by affected residents-mostly indigenous peo-
Fields: Environmental Justice or Business as Usual, 7 HAv. HuM. RTs. J. 199
(1994) [hereinafter Environmental Audit]; Judith Kimerling, Rights, Responsibili-
ties, and Realities: Environmental Protection Law in Ecuador's Amazon Oil
Fields, 2 Sw. J. of L. & TRADE AM. 293 (1995) [hereinafter Environmental Protec-
tion]; Brady, supra note 6; Joe Kane, supra note 10; See also, AMAZON CRUDE,
supra note 14.
20 Contamination of the water supply extends beyond small rivers and
streams to large bodies of water. Fish are limited and have a metallic odor. On
frequent occasions when the water also has an odor, people are reluctant to bathe
because of skin rashes that result. See id.
21 For a detailed review of deleterious health effects from oil-related pollution,
see Rights Violations in the Ecuadoran Amazon The Human Consequences of Oil
Development, The Center for Economic and Social Rights 12-20 (March 1994) (vis-
ited March 16, 2000) <http.www.cesr.org/text%20files/oil-l.pdf> [hereinafter
Rights Violations].
22 See AMAZON CRUDE, supra note 14, at 77, 81.
23 Id. at 250. The clans living in the forest have been known to kill with
spears if they feel threatened, and those Huaorani who could not be controlled by
missionaries "had to be eliminated." Id.
24 See Fabra, supra note 1, at 248.
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pie-against an oil consortium over which both Texaco and Ec-
uador's state-owned oil company, Petroecuador, have at various
times exercised substantial control. Two of these suits25 have
been brought in the United States by residents of the Oriente
region of Ecuador against Texaco for personal injuries resulting
from Texaco's exploration and exploitation of the region's rich
oil fields. These suits sought more than one billion dollars in
damages and cleanup costs, and demanded that Texaco rebuild
the oil-pumping infrastructure to meet prevailing United States
standards. A third suit, Ashanga, et. al. v. Texaco, Inc.,26 was
brought by Peruvian residents who live downstream from Ecua-
dor's Oriente region, and asserted similar injuries resulting
from the activities of the TNCs. In all three suits, the plaintiffs
alleged that Texpet, a Texaco subsidiary, dumped an estimated
thirty billion gallons of toxic waste into their environment while
extracting oil from the Ecuadoran Amazon between 1964 and
1992.27 The plaintiffs alleged that instead of pumping the sub-
stances back into emptied wells, Texaco dumped them into local
rivers, directly into unlined landfills or spread them on the local
dirt roads. 28 The plaintiffs claimed that Texaco, contrary to
world-wide accepted practices, did not make any provisions
with any of the oil wells it created in the Oriente region for the
re-injection of the "production water" into the ground.29 In addi-
tion, they alleged that the Trans-Ecuadoran Pipeline, con-
25 See Sequihua, et. al. v. Texaco, Inc.,et. al., 847 F. Supp. 61 (S.D. Tex. 1994);
Aguinda, et. al., v. Texaco, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
26 Ashanga et. al. v. Texaco, Inc., S.D.N.Y. Dkt. No. 94 Civ. 9266 (1994).
27 See id.
28 Plaintiffs complaint alleged that Texaco failed to pump unprocessable
crude oil and toxic residues back into the wells, as is the industry practice. In-
stead, Texaco disposed of these toxic substances by dumping them in open, unlined
pits, into the streams, rivers and wetlands, burning them in open pits without any
temperature or air pollution controls, and spreading oil on the roads. The com-
plaint further alleges that Texaco designed and constructed oil pipelines without
adequate safety features, resulting in spills of millions of gallons of crude oil.
Plaintiffs Complaint, Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc, No. 93 CIV 7527, 1994 WL 142006
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 1994) [ hereinafter Aguinda Complaint].
29 "Production Water" is a highly toxic product, containing heavy metal salts,
including arsenic, lead and mercury, hydrocarbons (benzene and naphthalene,
toxic ions and crude oil). These substances are suspected, and in some cases,
known carcinogens. Aguinda Complaint, supra note 28, at 18, para. 39, 40. In-
stead, Texaco's oil extraction design called for the dumping of production water
into the watershed of the region. The Ecuadoran government estimates that 16.8
million gallons (on average, 2,000 gallons per day for 20 years) of oil have spilled
[Vol. 12:47
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structed by Texaco, leaked large amounts of petroleum into the
environment, resulting in serious health effects from the con-
tamination, including poisoning, skin rashes, and pre-cancerous
growths. 30
A. Sequihua v. Texaco, Inc.
The first action, Sequihua v. Texaco, Inc., was brought in
1993 in the Southern District of Texas by Ecuadoran residents
from the Oriente province, alleging damages as a result of air,
water and soil contamination caused by Texaco and its affili-
ates. 31 After only five months, the case was dismissed by Dis-
trict Judge Norman Black, on the grounds of international
comity and forum non conveniens. In its application of the prin-
ciple of forum non conveniens, the Sequihua court reviewed a
number of private and public interest factors that led to its de-
termination. 32 Private interest factors considered by the Se-
quihua court included, (i) the necessity of multiple on-site
investigations in Ecuador, (ii) numerous foreign witnesses for
liability and damages, (iii) essential proof would be beyond com-
pulsory process of the U.S. court, (iv) costs of obtaining wit-
nesses would be significantly greater in litigation in the U.S.,
and (v) language barriers and translation costs would be
greater in the United States since the plaintiffs and essential
witnesses speak Spanish and Indian dialects such as
Quichua. 33 In his review of public interest factors, Judge Black
pointed to (i) the strong public interest in favor of resolving dis-
putes pertaining to land at their origin, (ii) Ecuador has a
greater underlying interest in the events than the United
States, (iii) choice of law rules would require the court to apply
foreign substantive laws, (iv) extraterritorial injunctive relief by
a US court would be unenforceable in Ecuador, and (v) the con-
gested dockets of U.S. courts.34 Taken together, Judge Black
reasoned that the public and private factors required dismissal
of the case.
from the pipeline, which is approximately six million gallons more than was spilled
in the Exxon Valdez oil spill. Id. at 20, para. 42.
30 See id.
31 Sequihua, supra note 25.
32 See id.
33 See id.
34 See id.
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B. Aguinda and Ashanga
Two separate class action suits were also brought against
Texaco in 1993 in the District Court for the Southern District of
New York.35 One suit, Aquinda, et. al v. Texaco, Inc., was filed
by Ecuadoran residents of the Oriente region;36 the second suit,
Gabriel Ashanga Jota, et. al. v. Texaco, Inc., ("Ashanga")37 was
brought by Peruvian residents who live downstream from Ecua-
dor in conjunction with a federation of thirty-six indigenous or-
ganizations in Peru.38 The plaintiffs in both suits allege
35 See Aguinda Complaint, supra note 28. Aguinda was originally assigned to
the late Judge Broderick who allowed plaintiffs "unusual leeway" to prove their
jurisdictional issues. See id. at 625. After Judge Broderick's death, the case was
reassigned to Judge Rakoff.
36 A number of indigenous and environmental groups, from Ecuador and the
U.S., also participated in the case through amicus curiae briefs and affidavits at-
testing to the impact of Texaco's operations on the indigenous peoples lifestyles.
See Arthaud, supra note 3, at 218. Environmental groups such as the Environ-
mental Defense Fund and Oxfam America also requested that the State Depart-
ment ignore Ecuador's request for intervention because it would send "a confusing
signal to indigenous peoples and others who look to our country as a leader in the
fight to protect the global environment." Id. at 153.
37 For purposes of this article, "Ashanga" refers to the District Court's case,
and "Jota" refers to the Court of Appeals ruling of the consolidated action.
38 Ashanga et. al. v. Texaco, Inc., S.D.N.Y. Dkt. No. 94 Civ. 9266 (1994) [here-
inafter Ashanga Complaint]. The principle differences between Ashanga and
Aguinda concern the residence of plaintiffs and places where relief is sought. The
Ashanga plaintiffs live in Peru, while the Aguinda plaintiffs live in Ecuador, and
the Ashanga plaintiffs seek equitable relief both in Peru and Ecuador, while the
Aguinda plaintiffs sought equitable relief in Ecuador only. The plaintiffs in
Aquinda consisted of at least 30,000 residents of Ecuador, including various indig-
enous tribes and immigrants to the Amazon region of Ecuador. Aguinda Com-
plaint, supra note 28, paras. 11, 30.
The Ashanga suit is brought on behalf of "[a]ll individuals who at any time
from 1972 to the present have resided within two miles of the banks of the Napo
River in Peru, measured when the river is at high flood stage, and who are harmed
in various ways by the actions of defendant, as described in this Complaint." See
Ashanga , para. 26 at 13 [hereinafter Ashanga Complaint]. The class includes at
least 25,000 members, including approximately 15,000 Quichua Indians, 700
Orejone Indians, 1,000 Yagua Indians, 300 Secoya Indians, and approximately
8,000 immigrants from other parts of Peru to the region. The Quichua, Orejones,
Yaguas, and Secoyas have inhabited the Peruvian rainforest for centuries. See
id. at para. 27. The Napo River is one of the principal tributaries of the Amazon. It
collects the waters from the northern Andes Mountains of Ecuador and the south-
ern Andes Mountains of Colombia. It flows approximately 200 miles in Ecuadoran
territory, growing gradually in size, and is navigable in its entire flow through
Peruvian territory. See id. at para. 34. Due to oil exploration related activities, the
Napo River is dangerously contaminated with high levels of toxins, such as ben-
zene, toluene, xylene, mercury, lead and hydrocarbons, many of which are known
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol12/iss1/3
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violations of the Alien Tort Claims Act,39 as well as common law
environmental claims, including negligence, public and private
nuisance, strict liability, and trespass. In addition, the com-
plaints included counts under common law theories of medical
monitoring and civil conspiracy. 40 Plaintiffs sought relief in
U.S. courts because they allegedly are unable to obtain relief in
Ecuador.41 The Alien Tort Claims Act grants federal district
courts original jurisdiction in "any civil action by an alien for a
tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty
of the United States."42 In the Aguinda complaint, no violation
of an international treaty was alleged, thus, at issue was
whether Texaco violated the "law of nations" or customary in-
ternational law.43
The litigation in these cases was also complicated by the
fact, according to court documents, that powers within the Ec-
uador government were split over whether they should join the
litigation in U.S. courts. Ecuador's Ambassador to the United
States had vigorously objected to the U.S. State Department,
arguing against a United States jurisdiction.44
While the Aguinda Court recognized that it differed from
Sequihua because Texaco is headquartered in its judicial dis-
carcinogens. In addressing the jurisdictional issues in Ashanga, plaintiffs argued
that Peruvian courts were not appropriate for the action because (1) neither Tex-
aco nor any of its subsidiaries has a legal presence in Peru, and could not be sued
in Peruvian courts, (ii) Texaco has no assets in Peru, and therefore plaintiffs could
not collect a judgment obtained against Texaco in Peru, and (iii) Peruvian courts
could not adequately adjudicate complex "toxic tort" litigation. See id. at paras. 53-
54.
39 Aguinda Complaint, supra note 28; Ashanga Complaint, supra note 38.
40 Aguinda Complaint, supra note 28.
41 See id. at 5-6.
42 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §9(b), codified at 28 U.S.C. §1350 (1988).
43 See infra note 102 and accompanying text.
44 In June 1996, Ecuador's Ambassador to the United States, Ambassador Ed-
gar Teran, submitted a letter to the Court where he reiterated his previous objec-
tions to the lawsuit. (Letter from Ambassador Teran to Judge Rakoff, June 12,
1996) provided in Court documents of Aguinda. See also Plaintiffs Supplemental
Memorandum in Further Opposition to Texaco, Inc.'s Motions to Dismiss (July
1996)[hereinafter Plaintiffs Supplemental Memorandum]. Plaintiffs argued that
the Attorney General never consented to an Ambassador as the legal representa-
tive of the Ecuadoran Government "simply because he is Ecuador's diplomatic rep-
resentative." Plaintiffs Supplemental Memorandum at 2. Plaintiffs further noted
that the Ambassador has a predisposition in favor of Texaco. Specifically, the Am-
bassador's former law firm listed Texaco as one of its clients. Id.
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trict, Judge Rakoff of the New York District Court, nevertheless
relied heavily on the reasoning of Sequihua, stating that such
difference was "insufficient to overcome the balance of other fac-
tors that weigh so heavily against retaining jurisdiction, as out-
lined in Sequihua."45
Judge Rakoff further pondered that plaintiffs' failure to
join indispensable parties, namely, Petroecuador and the Re-
public of Ecuador ("the Republic"), was another reason for dis-
missal of the case.46 Primarily, the Court found that the
equitable relief sought by plaintiffs (including total environ-
mental cleanup of the affected lands in Ecuador and future di-
rect monitoring) could not be undertaken in the absence of
Petroecuador or the Republic.47
Subsequently, in November 1996, the U.S. District court
dismissed the Aguinda case. The District Court's dismissal of
the Aguinda case rested on three foundations: (i) forum non
conveniens, (ii) international comity, and (iii) failure to join nec-
essary and indispensable parties under Rule 19 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. 4 Shortly thereafter, plaintiffs moved
for reconsideration, but not on the ground that the Court had
overlooked factual matters or controlling decisions. Rather, re-
consideration was premised on the allegation that the Republic
of Ecuador (the "Republic"), which previously had strenuously
objected to the Court's exercise of jurisdiction over the
Ecuadoran-centered dispute,49 was now prepared not only to
45 Aguinda, supra note 28, at 627.
46 See id.
47 Under the provisions of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C.
§1603(b) and §1604, neither the Republic or Petroecuador is subject to suit in the
United States, unless they agree to a waiver of immunity, or fall within an excep-
tion provided under the Act.
48 FED. R. Civ. P. 19.
49 The Republic of Ecuador also submitted an amicus curiae brief that argued
litigation in a United States court would diminish Ecuador's sovereignty. See Brief
Amicus Curiae of the Republic of Ecuador, (January 1994). In particular, Ecuador
referred to its need for foreign investment, and the reliance foreign investors place
in Ecuador's laws and regulations, prior to investing in Ecuador. "Foreign inves-
tors naturally assume that disputes relating to the development of Ecuador's natu-
ral resources are to be adjudicated by the courts of Ecuador." Id. at 2. Thus,
Ecuador's primary concern was that U.S. jurisdiction over the lawsuit would be-
come a serious disincentive to U.S. companies to invest in Ecuador, and thereby
disrupt Ecuador's economic program. The Republic also stated that it imple-
mented policies and regulations for the development of Ecuador's petroleum re-
[Vol. 12:47
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withdraw its objection but also to seek to intervene in the case.
At the same time, the Republic and Petroecuador filed a motion
seeking to intervene as plaintiffs in the dismissed action.50 On
August 12, 1997, Judge Rakoff denied Aguinda's motion for re-
consideration and the Republic's and Petroecuador's motion to
intervene. 51 On August 13, 1997, Judge Rakoff also dismissed
the Ashanga suit on the same grounds as Aguinda.
C. Court of Appeals: Jota, et al. v. Texaco, Inc.
Jota, et al. v. Texaco, Inc., is a consolidation of the appeals
from the Aguinda and Ashanga class action suits that had been
dismissed by the New York District Court, and the denial of Ec-
uador's motion to intervene. On October 5, 1998, the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated the District Court's
decision dismissing the lawsuits on jurisdictional grounds, and
remanded the case for further consideration. 52 Specifically, the
unanimous panel found that in the absence of a condition re-
quiring Texaco to submit to jurisdiction in Ecuador, the District
Court's dismissal on the grounds of forum non conveniens and
sources. Therefore, a U.S. court would "necessarily require an examination of the
policies of Ecuador with respect to its natural resources." Id. at 6.
50 The motion was filed pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a) and (b).
51 Judge Rakoff based his decision on the following reasons: (i) The motion to
intervene was prejudicially untimely since it was made after the suit had already
been dismissed (and the undercurrent of this reasoning was that the Republic had,
as recently as June 1996 reiterated its objection to U.S. adjudication in the inter-
ests of international comity). Moreover, the Republic's position was that it had
changed its view of the case as a result of an electoral change, and for policy rea-
sons, the Court could not support such motivations; (ii) the Republic attached limi-
tations and conditions to its proposed waiver of sovereign immunity "such that it
w,wlA rt-n+, ai +h1, b nefitn a prnopp." nrti nloinfiffwhilp nnf. hcinc' rpniiirpd. tn
assume all the correlative burdens;" and (iii) even if there were no limitations on
the Republic's and Petroecuador's request to intervene, they have no legal interest
warranting such intervention because both the Republic and Petroecuador had
previously entered into a formal settlement with Texaco, releasing Texaco from all
liabilities it may have to the Republic and Petroecuador. See Memorandum Order
(August 12, 1997)(provided in Court documents). As part of a 1995 cleanup agree-
ment with the previous Ecuadoran government, Texaco pledged to build water
treatment systems in four cities, with approximately one million dollars for refor-
estation, new schools and medical dispensaries, but residents state that they have
not seen any money. Reportedly, Texaco undertook cleanup of about $40 million.
See Ecuadoreans Want Texaco to Clear Toxic Residue, (last modified Mar. 3, 2000)
<http://www.latinolink.com/news/news98>.
52 Gabriel Ashanga Jota et. al. v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998)
[hereinafter Jota].
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international comity was erroneous. In addition, the appellate
court found that the District Court's reasoning regarding the
plaintiffs' failure to join an indispensable party was appropriate
only to the extent of activities currently under the Republic's
control. While it agreed that Ecuador's motion to intervene had
been properly denied, the Court of Appeals issued specific in-
structions that the District Court should reconsider upon re-
mand in light of the Republic's changed litigating position.
1. Forum non conveniens
The common law doctrine of forum non conveniens permits
a federal court to dismiss a case if adjudication in another forum
would better serve the interests of justice and convenience of
the parties.53 Accordingly, the Court of Appeals noted that the
doctrine presupposes the availability of at least two forums
where the defendant is amenable to process. 54 Although Tex-
aco's subsidiary, TexPet is subject to suit in Ecuadoran courts,
Texaco did not dispute that it was not amenable to suit in Ecua-
dor - a fact which the District Court had neglected to consider
in its analysis. In dismissing the case, the District Court had
based its reasoning concerning forum non conveniens on the Se-
quihua court's decision. There, the Sequihua court took only a
cursory look at whether an adequate forum was available. In
fact, the Sequihua Court's entire analysis on the issue follows:
In this case, it is clear from the affidavits of two former Eu-
cadoran Supreme Court justices that an adequate forum is availa-
ble in Ecuador. Plaintiffs are residents of Ecuador, and
Defendants are alleged to have conducted business in that coun-
try. Ecuador provides private remedies for tortious conduct and
maintains an independent judicial system with adequate procedu-
ral safeguards. Therefore, Ecuaqdor is an adequate and available
53 In federal courts, forum non conveniens is not governed by Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Unlike transfer of venue under FED R.C1V.P 1404(a), forum non
conveniens determinations result in the dismissal of the action, requiring plaintiff
to file suit in another forum. "The availability of an adequate alternative forum is a
prerequisite for a forum non conveniens dismissal. " Comment, Brooke Clagett,
Forum Non Conveniens in International Environmental Tort Suits: Closing the
Doors of U.S. Courts to Foreign Plaintiffs , 9 TUL. ENVrL. L.J. 513, 517 (1996)
[hereinafter Foreign Plaintiffs].
54 See Jota, supra note 52, at 159.
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forum even though it may not provide the same benefits as the
American system.55
The Court of Appeals found that the District Court's dis-
missal on the grounds of forum non conveniens was inappropri-
ate.56 In remanding the case back to the District Court, the
Court of Appeals directed the District Court to "independently
reweigh the factors relevant to a forum non conveniens dismis-
sal, rather than simply relying on Sequihua."57
2. Comity
The principles of international comity refer to "the recogni-
tion one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, ex-
ecutive or judicial acts of another nation."58 In applying its
decision, the District Court had adopted the comity considera-
tions set forth in Sequihua, which found that (i) the alleged
harm occurred entirely in Ecuador; (ii) the conduct was regu-
lated by the Republic and exercise of jurisdiction would inter-
fere with Ecuador's sovereign right to control its own
environmental resources; and (iii) "the Republic of Ecuador had
expressed its strenuous objections to the exercise of jurisdiction
by this Court." The Court of Appeals found that the District
Court erred in failing to consider whether Ecuador provided an
adequate forum, and whether Texaco had consented to the ju-
risdiction of Ecuadoran courts. The Appellate court added that
since the case is being remanded to consider these issues, the
District Court should also "reconsider the merits of the comity
55 Sequihua, et. al. v. Texaco Inc., et. al., 847 F. Supp. 61 (S.D. Tex. 199).
56 qee Joft, sinra note 52, at 159. Tn itb deision, the co_, onii pd tn th
litigation surrounding the Bhopal gas leak in India, where dismissal on the
grounds of forum non conveniens was conditioned on the grounds that Union Car-
bide consented to personal jurisdiction in India. See In re Union Carbide Corp.
Gas Plant Disaster, 809 F.2d 195, 203-04 (2d Cir. 1987).
57 See Jota, supra note 52. Plaintiffs stated that differences between Jota and
Sequihua include that the Jota case is brought under the Alien Tort Claims Act,
and dismissal would be contrary to Congress' intent to provide a federal forum for
aliens suing domestic entities. In addition, unlike the plaintiffs in Sequihua,
plaintiffs in Jota are only challenging decisions made by Texaco within the United
States, and therefore, necessary documents and witnesses are more accessible in a
U.S. forum. Id.
58 Jota, supra note 52, at 159, quoting Pravin Banker Associates, Ltd. v. Banco
Popular del Peru, 109 F.3d 850, 854 (2d Cir. 1997)(quoting Hilton v. Guyot, 159
U.S. 113, 164 (1895)).
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issue in light of Ecuador's changed litigating position."5 9 The
Jota court implied that Sequihua had been correctly decided in
light of the fact that the Republic had vigorously opposed juris-
diction at that time. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals noted
that the District Court's reliance on Sequihua was "substan-
tially eroded" since the Republic now embraced a United States
forum.60
3. Failure to Join an Indispensable Party
The Court of Appeals reviewed the District Court's determi-
nation on failure to join an indispensable party under the abuse
of discretion standard.6 1 Plaintiffs argued, and the Court of Ap-
peals agreed, that the Republic's participation was not neces-
sary for the full scope of equitable relief sought. 62 Rather, at
most, the dismissal of certain equitable claims requiring the Re-
public's participation may be necessary, but the remaining equi-
table and legal claims should be allowed to stand.6 3 The District
Court had relied on Rule 19(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, and reasoned that without Ecuador as a party, plaintiffs
could not receive complete relief. The Court of Appeals rejected
the District Court's analysis, stating that while Rule 19(a) re-
quires the Court to join, where feasible, any person who is nec-
essary to effect complete relief, Rule 19(b) "does not authorize
dismissal simply because such a party cannot be joined." In-
stead, the Court must consider "in equity and good conscience
... the extent to which, by protective provisions in the judg-
ment, by the shaping of relief, or other measures, the prejudice
can be lessened or avoided."64 The Appellate Court therefore
concluded that while the District Court had discretion to dis-
59 See id. at 160.
60 See id.
61 See id. at 161, quoting Envirotech Corp. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 729 F.2d
70, 75 (2d Cir. 1984).
62 The specific relief requested by plaintiffs includes "undertaking or financ-
ing environmental cleanup, to include access to potable water and hunting and
fishing grounds, renovating or closing the Trans-Ecuadoran Pipeline, creation of
an environmental monitoring fund, formulating standards to govern future Texaco
oil dvelopment, creation of a medical monitoring fund, an injunction restraining
Texaco from entering into activities that run a high risk of environmental or
human injuries, and restitution." Jota, supra note 52, at 164, n. 3.
63 See id. at 9.
64 FED. R. Crv. P. 19(b).
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miss some portions of plaintiffs complaint, dismissal of the en-
tire complaint exceeded its discretion since some portions of the
relief could be granted by Texaco without the participation of
the Republic.
4. Denial of Ecuador's Post-Judgment Motion to Intervene
With respect to the District Court's denial of Ecuador's
post-judgment motion to intervene, on the issue of timeliness,
the Republic argued that (i) Judge Rakoff was aware of conflict-
ing opinions within the Ecuadoran government over the appro-
priate forum for the lawsuit, and (ii) the Republic did not realize
the need to intervene in the action before it had been dis-
missed. 65 The Court of Appeals rejected the Republic's argu-
ments noting that the official position of the Ecuadoran
Ambassador to the United States remained opposed to the liti-
gation, stating that "[a]n ambassador generally has the power
to 'bind the state that he represents."66 The Court of Appeals
concluded that the District Court was therefore entitled to rely
on the Ambassador's representations unless it was aware that
he lacked the authority to bind Ecuador.67 The Court of Ap-
peals also noted that the Republic's statement that it had not
expected the Court's decision to treat it as an indispensable
party was not warranted since the motion had been pending
before the Court for some time. Although the Court of Appeals
agreed with the District Court that Ecuador would need to
agree to a complete waiver of sovereign immunity in order to
intervene, the Court concluded that on remand, Ecuador's mo-
tion to intervene will be available for reconsideration, and Ec-
uauUI wili Lia.ve tlle UppotUI bUlll tU ie lvl Ie pu bibluio regirUing
its waiver of sovereign immunity.68
65 See Jota, supra note 52, at 162.
66 Id., quoting First Fidelity Bank, N.A. v. Government of Antigua & Barbuda,
877 F.2d 189, 192 (2d Cir. 1989); See also Developments in the Law - International
Environmental Law, 104 HARv. L. REV. 1609 (1991). Court documents filed by
plaintiffs allege that Ambassador Teran had close ties to Texaco, including the law
firm to which he was affiliated listed Texaco as one of its clients. See supra note
44. Documents provided to Judge Rakoff showed that the Ecuadoran Congress
supported the litigation in United States courts.
67 See id.
68 See id.
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In its decision, the Court of Appeals declined to decide
under what circumstances a court might remand a case solely
because of a nation's altered litigating position. Rather, it lim-
ited its decision to remand on the grounds of forum non con-
veniens, comity, and failure to join an indispensable party.
Nevertheless, it directed the District Court to consider Ecua-
dor's changed position when reconsidering these grounds.69
Thus, although the Court of Appeals emphasized that it was not
basing its decision to remand on the fact that Ecuador had offi-
cially changed it position, it is questionable whether the Court
would have come to the same conclusions had Ecuador contin-
ued to oppose jurisdiction in the U.S. courts.
5. Recent Developments
Currently pending before the District Court is the renewed
motion by Texaco to dismiss the case on grounds of forum non
conveniens and international comity, premised on Texaco's con-
sent to the jurisdiction of the court of Ecuador and Peru. Upon
remand, the District Court will now have to reassess whether
Ecuador provides a suitable alternative forum through an in-
quiry of whether an adequate remedy is available in Ecuadoran
courts. 70 Although the New York District Court found that the
application of Ecuadoran law by a New York jury was problem-
atic, the Court has also found that recent events call into ques-
tion the ability of Ecuadoran tribunal to adjudicate in an
impartial and independent manner.71
69 See id.
70 A detailed discussion of Ecuador's environmental laws is beyond the scope
of this article. For a thorough overview of Ecuador's environmental regulations
and available remedies, see generally, Kimerling, Environmental Protection, supra
note 19.
71 On January 21, 2000, a military coup deposed the existing President, and
recounted a resurgence of military activity controlling the judiciary. Based on the
events, on January 31, 2000, the District Court ordered the parties to further brief
the issue of whether an Ecuadoran court could independently and impartially ad-
judicate the case. Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 93 Civ. 7527 (JSR),
94 Civ. 9266 (S.D.N.Y., Jan. 31, 2000).
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a. Ecuadoran Law
Although the 1979 Ecuadoran Constitution includes the
right to an environment free of contamination, 72 Ecuador's judi-
cial system provides no practical means for private citizens to
redress environmental harm. 73 Under the Ecuadoran Civil
Code, Texaco was bound by a general duty of care in all of its
operations.7 4 Incorporating both the "polluter pays" principle
and a duty to make restitution, Texaco's liability for damages in
Ecuador depends upon whether Texaco was negligent or mali-
cious, and whether damage or threatened harm exists in accor-
dance with principles under the Civil Code. Although
Ecuadoran law theoretically provides protection of the rights of
Amazonian people and land from destructive development poli-
cies, the law is applied selectively and implements a policy of
maximizing oil profits.75 Even when Ecuador's environmental
laws are enforced, the minimal fines imposed do little in the
way of deterrence.7 6
In its Complaint, Plaintiffs stated that procedural barriers
in Ecuador make it an inadequate forum. Such barriers in-
clude: (i) prohibition of parties from calling their own witnesses
unless opposing parties agree; (ii) discovery limited to question-
ing conducted by the judge; (iii) no oral, direct or cross examina-
tion of witnesses is allowed, and (iv) no provision for class action
suits. 7 Other barriers to an impartial forum in Ecuador include
a judiciary that is biased since it is controlled by the military,
72 See Kimerling, Environmental Audit, supra note 19, at 251. Art. 19(2) of
the Ecuadoran Constitution provides: "Without prejudice to other rights necessary
for a completeu mrnala anda inate-1nai deveflopment thatO ueliives' nu tu peul ul 6 Inn-
ture, the State guarantees: ... The right to live in an environment free of contami-
nation. It is the duty of the State to be vigilant so that this right should not be
affected and to guard nature's preservation. The law will establish the restrictions
to exercise certain rights or liberties so as to protect the environment." In addi-
tion, Art. 44 provides that the Ecuadoran State guarantees the civil, political, eco-
nomic, social, and cultural rights recognized in international instruments in force.
Id.
73 See id.
74 See id. at 209.
75 See Kimerling, Environmental Protection, supra note 19, at 377.
76 Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., Preface to JUDITH KIMERLING, supra note 13, at ix,
xxvi.
77 Aguinda Complaint, supra note 28, n.2 at 3.
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which is funded exclusively by oil revenues. 78 With weak do-
mestic enforcement in host countries, victims of environmental
abuses have no choice but to seek redress outside their national
legal system.
III. ACCOUNTABILITY OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS
TNCs offer many enticing benefits to developing countries.
Even Agenda 21, produced by the 1991 Earth Summit, recog-
nized that "business and industry, including transnational cor-
porations, play a crucial role in the social and economic
development of a country."79 TNCs contribute to the growth of
developing nations by providing "major trading, employment
and livelihood opportunities" and strengthening the role of wo-
men in society.80 In addition, TNCs are the principle vehicle for
the transfer of technology, and increase in the facilities of host
countries in international trade through established global net-
works of the TNC. Similarly, developing countries are attrac-
tive to TNCs for a variety of reasons, including less stringent
environmental regulations, availability of untapped natural re-
sources, and cheap labor. Despite these mutually beneficial as-
pects, the track record of TNCs in developing countries is
dubious, at best.81
78 See Arthaud, supra note 3, at 227. In addition, a Department of State rep-
resentative stated that indigenous peoples had been victims of attacks by paramili-
tary groups.
79 Reports to the U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, U.N.
Conference on Environment and Development, Agenda 21, Annex II, at 29, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF. 151/26 (1992) [hereinafter Agenda 21]. "Transnational Corporation"
is defined as "a national company in two or more countries operating in associa-
tion, with one controlling the other in whole or in part." See Robert J. Fowler,
International Environmental Standards for Transnational Corporations, 25
ENVTL. L. 1, (1995). Id. at 1 n. 2, quoting THOMAS DONALDSON, THE ETHICS OF
INTERNATIONAL BusINEss 30 (1992).
80 See Agenda 21, supra note 79.
81 Toxic gas released from Union Carbide's plant in Bhopal, India resulted in
the death of over 1800 people and affected 200,000 more. See Sudhir K. Chopra,
Multinational Corporations in the Aftermath of Bhopal: The Need for a New Com-
prehensive Global Regime for Transnational Corporate Activity, 29 VAL. U.L. REv.
235, 236 n. 2 (1994). Oil exploitation activities by TNCs in the Niger Delta region
of Nigeria has resulted in increased cancer among the Ogoni people, and the devas-
tation of the Ogoni's homeland, including leaking pipelines, polluted water and
wells, air pollution, and emulsified oil in villagers' fields. See Joshua P. Eaton, The
Nigerian Tragedy, Environmental Regulation of Transnational Corporations, and
the Human Right to a Healthy Environment, 15 B.U. INT'L L. J. 261, 268 (1997).
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Although industrialized nations establish stringent envi-
ronmental regulations for corporations operating within their
borders, these regulations do not apply extraterritorially to sim-
ilar operations in foreign countries.8 2 For instance, in the
United States, the Resource Conservation Recovery Act (RCRA)
regulates the treatment, storage and disposal of hazardous
wastes from "cradle to grave."8 3 Similarly, the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
(CERCLA) imposes strict liability for the cleanup of hazardous
wastes on all potentially responsible parties.8 4 However,
neither of these statutes applies to the operation of U.S. or
other foreign corporations abroad.8 5 In the absence of a univer-
sal code of conduct for international corporations,8 6 a double
standard exists where industrialized-based companies can oper-
Activities by a Japanese/Malaysian joint venture resulted in the dumping of radio-
active waste in a small Malaysian village. See ANDREW HARDING, PRACTICAL
HUMAN RIGHTS, NGos AND THE ENVIRONMENT IN MALAYSIA, , IN HUMAN RIGHTS
APPROACHES TO ENVIRONMENTAL (Alan Boyle and Michael Anderson eds., 1996).
Burmese citizens were subjected to forced labor and other human rights abuses in
connection with a UNOCAL gas pipeline project. See National Coalition Govern-
ment of the Union of Burma, et. al. v. UNOCAL, Inc., et. al., 176 F.R.D. 329 (C.D.
Cal. 1997).
82 See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
Act of 1980 (CERCLA) 42 U.S.C. §9601-9675; and Resource Conservation Recovery
Act, 42 U.S.C. §6901-6922. And, as in the case of Ecuador, host countries often
choose not to enforce their environmental regulations against TNCs, because they
are often working in tandem toward a profit motive.
83 R. PERCIVAL, et. al., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION LAw, SCIENCE, AND
POLICY 107 (1996).
84 Id. at 108.
85 See Arthaud, supra note 3, at 210.
86 Although the United Nations has tried to establish a code of conduct for
TNCs, the cffo-rt was abandoned v.horn iti- 7nvred fhat coron11i~ qmnngr na-
tions was not possible. See Fowler, supra note 79, at 3. The 1988 draft provides the
most recent provision of the U.N. Code of Conduct concerning environmental pro-
tection: "Transnational corporations shall carry out their activities in accordance
with national laws, regulations, established administrative practices and policies
relating to the preservation of the environment of the countries in which they oper-
ate and with due regard to relevant international standards. Transnational corpo-
rations should, in performing their activities, take steps to protect the
environment and where damaged rehabilitate it and should make efforts to de-
velop and apply adequate technologies for this purpose." U.N. Draft Code of Con-
duct on Transnational Corporations, U.N. ESCOR, Org. Sess. 1988, Provisional
Agenda Item 2, at 11, U.N. Doc. E/1988/39/Add.1, (1988).
The Organization for Economic Development (OECD) has also formulated a
set of guidelines for multinational enterprises, which place responsibility on TNCs
to take appropriate measures to mitigate adverse environmental impacts. OECD
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ate without regard to the standards imposed by their "home"
countries with often devastating consequences.8 7 Unregulated
TNCs have the ability to move their manufacturing from coun-
try to country in search of those who will work for the lowest
wages and under the lowest standards. s8 Ironically, the onus
has been on host countries to regulate the behavior of TNCs op-
erating within their borders, even though the wealth and global
power of a TNC often extends far beyond that of the host coun-
try within which it operates.8 9 In the countries where the com-
panies are headquartered, governments are caught in the
middle of global corporate investment policies and professed ex-
pectations that investment will advance human rights.90
Some commentators propose that the U.S. should require
that all U.S. persons and corporations comply with U.S. stan-
dards in their foreign operations.9 1 Taking this a step further,
an international agreement on the environmental conduct of
TNCs could require that all corporations comply with the envi-
Guideline for Multinational Enterprises, 25 I.L.M. 494 (1986). However, neither
the UN draft Code of conduct, or the OECD guidelines have any binding effect.
87 Oil Exploration activities by oil conglomerates have had disastrous effects
beyond Ecuador. In Nigeria, the Ogoni people have claimed that Royal Dutch
Shell has polluted their waters and lands, as well as their livelihood, which de-
pended upon fishing and farming. See generally, Eaton, supra note 81; see also
Douglas Cassel, 1963 Corporate Initiatives: A Second Human Rights Revolution ,
19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1963 (1996). And despite the protests of the international
community, a leading activitist against Shell, Ken Saro-Wiwa, was executed in
1995 by Nigeria's military regime. Shell refused to play a role in stopping the
execution. See Eaton, supra note 81 at 270-271; see also Ambrose 0.0. Ekpu, Envi-
ronmental Impact of Oil on Water: A Comparative Overview of the Law and Policy
in the United States and Nigeria, 24 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 55 (1995); Gen.
Abdulsalami Abubaker, Opposition Groups in Nigeria Threaten Foreign Oil Work-
ers, New York) N.Y. TIMES, October 12, 1998; Ethnic Clashes Kill Hundreds of
Nigerians, York) N.Y. TIMES, October, 4, 1998.
One alternative to giving domestic laws extraterritorial effect or legislating
standards of conduct for MNCs is the adoption of voluntary corporate codes. See
Brad J. Kieserman, Comment, Profits and Principles: Promoting Multinational
Corporate Responsibility ByAmending the Alien Tort Claims Act, 48 CATH.U.L.
REV. 881, 883 (1999). For a survey of voluntary corporate codes of conduct, see
Leslie Wells, A Wolf in Sneep's Cothing: Shy Unocal Should Be Liable Under U.S.
Law for Human Rights Abuses in Burma, 32 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 35 (1999).
88 See Thomas L. Friedman, N.Y.TIMES, July 30, 1999 (op.ed).
89 See Fowler, supra note 79.
90 See Human Rights Watch Program on Corporations and Human Rights,
last visited March, 2000. <http://www.hrw.org/hrw/about/initiative/corp.html.>
91 See Alan Neff, Not in Their Backyards, Either: A Proposal for a Foreign
Environmental Practices Act, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 477 (1990).
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ronmental regulations of their state of incorporation when oper-
ating on foreign soil. Realistically, such an agreement would be
difficult to reach for policy and economic reasons, (some devel-
oping countries may prefer relaxed environmental standards as
a method of encouraging investment and strengthening their
competitive advantage in drawing those industries).92 Such an
agreement might also encourage certain states with less restric-
tive environmental standards to become a haven for the incor-
poration of TNCs seeking to evade strict environmental
standards (although requirements for incorporation could be
structured so as to avoid sham incorporations).
With little international oversight, multinational corpora-
tions are left free to pursue their profits in developing countries
without sufficient regulatory restrictions, resulting in human
and environmental tragedies. Left with no opportunity to ob-
tain reparation in their own domestic courts, plaintiffs injured
by private actors have sought a forum in U.S. courts.
A. Redress in U.S. Courts
Increasingly, foreign plaintiffs have brought actions for
human rights abuses in U.S. District Courts under the Alien
Tort Claims Act ("the ATCA"), 93 not without some difficulty.94
Under the ATCA, a foreign citizen can bring suit for any human
rights abuse that violates "the law of nations" 95 or an interna-
tional treaty to which the U.S. belongs. 96 In bringing such
claims, plaintiffs must get around two substantial hoops. First,
92 See Developments in the Law - International Environmental Law, supra
note 66.
93 28 U.S.C. §1350 (1994).
94 Only one suit brought under ATCA against a private corporate defendant
has survived a motion for summary judgment. See Doe v. Unocal, 963 F. Supp.
880, 897-98 (C.D. Cal. 1997). In Unocal, Burmese citizens brought suit against a
Myanmar oil and gas enterprise and Unocal, alleging human rights violations in
furtherance of the Yadana gas pipeline project in Burma.
95 The court in the landmark case of Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d
Cir. 1980), adopted guidelines for determining a violation of the law of nations
under the ATCA: (i) the wrong must be a violation that "commands the 'general
assent of civilized nations'"; (ii) the prohibition against the wrong must be "clear
and unabmiguous" and (iii) the nations of othe world must demonstrate expressly
by international agreements "that the wrong is of mutual, and not merely several,
concern." Id. at 881, 884, 888.
96 See supra note 94.
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under the doctrine of forum non conveniens,97 past precedents
indicate that foreign plaintiffs cannot easily establish conve-
nience of a U.S. forum. While courts have some discretion in
cases involving foreign plaintiffs and domestic defendants,
courts have tended to dismiss such cases.98
Second, although the ATCA provides original district court
jurisdiction over all cases where an alien sues for a tort commit-
ted in violation of "the law of nations"99 or under a treaty of the
United States, courts have construed the ATCA narrowly, find-
ing that it "applies only to shockingly egregious violations of
universally recognized principles of international law."100 In the
application of the ATCA to human rights violations, the hold-
ings have been limited to situations "where the nations of the
world have demonstrated that the wrong is of mutual and not
merely several concern, by means of express international ac-
cords, that a wrong generally recognized becomes an interna-
tional law violation within the meaning of the statute."10 1
97 See generally, Foreign Plaintiffs, supra note 53, (which argues that forum
non conveniens should be inapplicable to suits by private plaintiffs against U.S.
corporations for environmental damage resulting from the development of natural
resources). See e.g., Dow Chemical Co. v. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W. 2d 674 (Tex.
1990) (where the Supreme Court of Texas held that the doctrine of forum non con-
veniens was inapplicabe to personal injury suits brought in Texas).
98 See e.g., Sibaja v. Dow Chem. Co., 757 F.2d 1215 (11th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 948 (1985); Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., 890 F. Supp. 1324 (S.D. Tex.
1995); Sequihua v. Texaco, 847 F. Supp. 61 (1994); Cabalceta v. Standard Fruit
Co., 667 F. Supp. 833 (S.D. Fla. 1987), affd in part and rev'd in part, 883 F.2d 1553
(11th Cir. 1989); In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, 634 F. Supp. 842
(S.D.N.Y. 1986), afl'd in part and rev'd in part, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987).
99 The law of nations is customary international law, which is established
through the widespread practice of nations, as well as the conviction by states that
the practice reflects a legal obligation or opinio juris. See AKEHURST'S MODERN
INTRODUCTION To INTERNATIONAL LAw 44 (Peter Malanczuk, ed., 7th ed., 1997).
100 Zapata v. Quinn, 707 F.2d 691, 692 (2d Cir. 1983). See also Amlon Metals,
Inc. v. FMC Corp., 775 F. Supp. 668, 671 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (where foreign plaintiffs
alleged that U.S. defendant's dumping of hazardous waste in a foreign country
violated Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration, the court held there was no
violation of the law of nations, and therefore, the ATCA did not apply).
101 Zapata, id. at 692. U.S. courts have found jurisdiction where conduct vio-
lated established norms of international human rights law, and therefore, the law
of nations. See Filartiga v. Americo Norberto Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir.
1980) (where a high level Paraguayan police officer violated the ATCA in the tor-
ture of another Paraguayan citizen); see also Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d
Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2524 (1996); Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 25 F.3d
1467 (9th Cir. 1994); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Kavlin, 978 F. Supp. 1078, 1090-94
(S.D. Fla. 1997); Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 889-92 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol12/iss1/3
2000] THE IMPLICATIONS OF JOTA v. TEXACO
In the Jota case, plaintiffs have brought their case under
the ATCA, but do not allege a violation of an international
treaty. Therefore, for U.S. District Court jurisdiction under the
ATCA, plaintiffs must establish a violation of the law of na-
tions. 10 2 While it is established as customary international law
that a state may incur liability from environmental damage
that arises beyond national borders, the extent that this princi-
ple can be extended to corporations is unsettled. 10 3 Accord-
ingly, the question remains whether the human right to a
healthy environment is recognized among nations to the extent
to be considered "the law of nations."10 4
B. The Human Right to a Healthy Environment
Although the human right to a healthy environment exists
in principle, it is debatable as to whether it has crystallized to
the level of customary international law. 10 5 Many human rights
102 Upon remand, plaintiffs will base their arguments for jurisdiction under
the ATCA on principles set forth in Filartiga ,which stated that the "law of nations
'may be ascertained by consulting the works of jurists ... or by the general usage
and practice of nations; or by judicial decisions recognizing and enforcing that
law." See Filartiga, id. at 880 (citing United States v. Smith, 18 S. (5 Wheat.) 153,
160-61, 5 L.Ed. 57 (1820); Lopes v. Reederei Richard Schroder, 225 F.Supp. 292,
295 (E.D. Pa. 1963)). Telephone Interview with Plaintiffs' attorney, Christobel
Bonifaz, December 17, 1998. Plaintiffs have testimony by experts in the case that
attest that Texaco did not follow standard industry practice concerning the produc-
tion water; Plaintiffs argue that this practice is violative of general practice under
New York and U.S. law and therefore a violation of the law of nations. See id.
103 See Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Canada) [1941], 3 R.I.A.A. 1905; Lac
Lanoux case (France v. Spain), 53 AM.J.INT'L L. 156 (1957); see also The Rio Decla-
ration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 151/5 Rev. 1 (1992),
reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 874 (1992) (Principle 2 provides that states have "the sover-
e ga riohf" fn Pvn1nitf thir own resoirce pnrsnint to their own environmental and
developmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their
jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of
areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction."); see also Declaration of the
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Principle 21, U.N. Doc.
A./CONF. 48/14 (Stockholm 1972), reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972)[hereinafter
Stockholm Declaration].
104 For a detailed discussion on this issue, see Eaton, supra note 81 at 297-299
(states view the right to a healthy environment as an aspiration, not a legal obliga-
tion or opiniojuris; accordingly, the right to a healthy environment is not yet cus-
tomary international law). Eaton furthers argues that the right to a healthy
environment is also not part of general international law because it is not "inher-
ent in the nature of the basic concept of the international system." Id. at 298.
105 Principle 22 of the Stockholm Declaration provides that states "shall co-
operate to develop the international law relating to liability and compensation for
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treaties contain provisions that recognize emerging environ-
mental rights, 10 6 but there is no consensus as to what that right
entails. 10 7 Considered "third generation" rights by some (where
the primary characteristic is that they are essentially collective
in dimension and require international cooperation for their
achievement),10 8 others argue that a healthy environment is a
precondition to "first generation" substantive rights, such as the
right to life.' 0 9 Without legal recognition of the right to a
healthy environment, such rights are not binding, and interna-
tional tribunals do not have the jurisdiction to hear a claim.
Thus, absent an international treaty on international environ-
mental rights, or the recognition of the human right to a
healthy environment as customary international law, the
human right to a healthy environment remains nonjusticiable
throughout most of the world. 11°
the victims of pollution and other environmental damage caused by activities
within the jurisdiction of such states to areas beyond their jurisdiction." Stock-
holm Declaration on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/5/Rev. 1
(1972), reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972). Although this gives support to the con-
cept of liability for environmental damage beyond national borders, it places no
real requirements on states.
106 See The International Bill of Human Rights, which includes the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, adopted Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217 A (III), U.N.
Doc. A/810 (1948); the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights,
adopted Dec. 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI) , art. 49; and the International Cove-
nant of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, 2200 (XXI),
art. 27.
107 Although a detailed examination of human rights and the environment is
beyond the scope of this article, many articles have provided a comprehensive ex-
amination of emerging environmental rights as human rights. See, e.g., E. Brown
Weiss, International Environmental Law: Contemporary Issues and the Emer-
gence of a New World Order, 81 GEO. L.J. 675 (1993); Shelton, Human Rights,
Environmental Rights, and the Right to Environment, 28 STAN. J. OF INT'L LAW 103
(1991); William A. Shutkin, International Human Rights and the Earth: The Pro-
tection of Indigenous Peoples and the Environment, 31 VA. J. INT'L L. 479, 493-500
(1991); Prudence E. Taylor, From Environmental to Ecological Human Rights: A
New Dynamic in International Law, 10 GEO. INT'L ENvL. L. REV. 309 (1998).
108 See Burns H. Weston, Human Rights, 6 Hum. RTS. Q. 257, 266 (1986).
(Weston suggests other third generation rights include the right to political, eco-
nomic, and cultural self-determination, the right to economic and social develop-
ment; the right to participate in and benefit from the common heritage of
mankind; and the right to peace).
109 See Shelton, supra note 107, at 104-111.
110 The Indian courts have read a substantive right to a "wholesome environ-
ment" as inclusive within the justiciable fundamental right to life, under Art. 21 of
the Indian Constitution. Thus, individuals have a cause of action for violations
that have serious detrimental results to the environment.
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1. Indigenous Peoples and Environmental Rights
While disproportionate environmental impacts have disas-
trous effects for all groups-at-risk, the effects on indigenous peo-
ples are particularly pronounced. Increasingly, human rights
concerns for indigenous peoples have centered on the fact that
they inhabit some of the world's most fragile ecosystems and
suffer from some of the worst environmental degradation.111
Most indigenous people have a land-based subsistence economy;
thus, when their environment is negatively impacted, it goes to
the core of their existence as a group.112
The emerging integration of environmental, developmental
and human rights objectives is apparent in recent instruments
concerning indigenous peoples, such as the United Nations 113
111 See Shutkin, supra note 107, 493-500.
112 See TOM B.K. GOLDTOOTH, INDIGENOUS NATIONS: SUMMARY OF SOVER-
EIGNTY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, 138, 143 (cited in
Environmental Justice, Issues, Policies, and Solutions (1995); if one controls the
resources, then one controls the land). TNCs and national governments have ex-
tracted natural resources of indigeneous lands, and continue to do so at an ex-
panding rate. In the case of Ecuador, the resources are controlled by the
government, and therefore, the indigenous peoples of the Oriente region have no
control effective land rights (even though they may hold title to the land). After
repeated protests by indigenous groups, the Huaorani were granted communal le-
gal title to 612,560 hectares of their traditional territory. However, this land grant
has done little to address their concerns about oil development since a condition in
the grant bans them from obstructing oil development on their land, because the
State is the owner of subsoil resources. See Taylor, supra note 107, at 252-53.
Both the Constitution Art. 46(1) and Hydrocarbons Law (Art. 1) establish that de-
posits of hydrocarbons in Ecuadoran territory belong to the state. In addition, con-
ditions to their land title forbid them to carry out any mining or oil exploration/
exploitation, nor can they give concession to others to exploit their territory. See id.
113 Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,
adopted Aug. 26, 1994, 31 I.L.M. 541 (1995) [hereinafter 1994 U.N. Indigenous
Peoples Declaration]. Arts. 25-28 of the Declaration provide the most significance
to the environment. Art. 26 provides that "Indigenous peoples have the right to
own, develop, control and use the lands and territories, including the total environ-
ment of the lands, air, waters, coastal seas, sea-ice, flora and fauna and other re-
sources which they have traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used. This
includes the right to the full recognition of their laws, traditions and customs,
land-tenure systems and institutions for the development and management of re-
sources, and the right to effective measures by States to prevent any interference
with, alienation or of encroachment upon these rights." Art. 27 states that "Indige-
nous peoples have the right to the restitution of the lands, territories and resources
which they have traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used, and which
have been confiscated, occupied, used or damaged without their free and informed
consent."
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and Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 14 draft dec-
larations on indigenous peoples. The ILO Convention Concern-
ing Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries 115
makes explicit references to links between indigenous peoples
and the environment (although many states, including Ecua-
dor, have not ratified it, and are therefore not bound by its pro-
viSions).1 6 The preamble to the 1992 Convention on Biological
Diversity recognizes the "dependence of many indigenous and
local communities embodying traditional lifestyles on biological
resources. 11 7 Taken together, these documents indicate that the
rights of indigenous peoples are crystallizing into a substantial
body of law. However, the provisions of these conventions only
apply to states. Therefore, non-state actors such as multina-
tional corporations escape their purview.
International human rights committees and tribunals have
increasingly extended the application of the fundamental right
to a healthy environment to situations concerning life-threaten-
ing environmental risks. 118 Recent decisions indicate an emerg-
ing international consensus that states have an affirmative
duty to prevent situations in their jurisdictions that may
threaten human life.-19
114 Organization of American States, Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights, Draft of the Inter-American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peo-
ples, OEA/Ser. G, CP/doc. 2878/97 corr.1 (Feb. 10, 1998). Available at <www.oas.
org> (last visited June 26, 2000).
115 International Labour Organization, Convention Concerning Indigenous and
Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, ILO Convention No. 169 (1989). Availa-
ble at <http://ilolex.ilo.ch:1567/scripts/convd.pl?c169> (last visited June 26, 2000).
116 Art. 2 of the Convention provides that "governments shall have the respon-
sibility for developing, with the participation of the peoples concerned, co-ordi-
nated and systematic action to protect the rights of these peoples and to guarantee
respect for their integrity." Article 4 states that "special measures shall be
adopted as appropriate for safeguarding the persons, institutions, property, la-
bour, cultures and environment of the peoples concerned." Part II of the Conven-
tion specifically focuses on land, including provisions for the recognition of cultural
and spiritual values of the land, land ownership rights, rights to natural resources,
and protection from unlawful relocation their land. See also arts. 13, 14, 15, and
16.
117 Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for signature June 5, 1992, 31
I.L.M. 818 (entered into force Dec. 27, 1993). Ecuador has ratified the Convention.
11s See Taylor, supra note 107, at 340.
119 See Michelle Leighton Schwartz, International Legal Protection for Victims
of Environmental Abuse, 18 YALE J. INT'L L. 355, 362-63 (1993).
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In 1990, a petition was filed on behalf of the Huaorani peo-
ple with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
(IACHR) against the government of Ecuador. 120 The petition al-
leged violation of the Huaorani people's rights under the Ameri-
can Convention on Human Rights, as a result of the oil
development operations in their territory. Such violations in-
cluded the contamination of their water, soil and air.12 1 Upon
investigation, the Commission released their report that con-
cluded development must
take place under conditions that respect and ensure the human
rights of the individuals affected . . . 'Decontamination is needed
to correct mistakes that ought never to have happened.' Both the
State and the companies conducting oil exploration activities are
responsible for such anomalies and both should be responsible for
correcting them. It is the duty of the State to ensure that they are
corrected.122
The Commission's recommendations included that the Republic
of Ecuador implement measures to ensure (i) full participation
of all persons in decisions that directly affect their environment,
and (ii) access to effective judicial recourse. 123
A decision by the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights determined that ecological destruction of Yanomami
lands violated the right to life, through the incursion of disease,
colonists, and the displacement of Yanomami people. 124 The In-
ter-American Commission recommended that the Brazilian gov-
ernment take preventative health measures, establish a
Yanomami park, and consult with indigenous populations.
The International Human Rights Committee examined en-
vironmenta! threats to the right to life under Article 6(1) of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
120 The petition was brought by the Confederacion de Nacionalidades In-
digenas de la Amazonia Ecuatoriana (CONFENIAE). In 1992, the Organizacio de
la Nacionalidad Huaorani de la Amazonia Ecuatoriana (ONHAE) joined CON-
FENLAE as co-petitioners in the case. See Fabra , supra note 1, at 259.
121 See Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Situta-
tion of Human Rights in Ecuador, 77 (1997).
122 See id. at 94.
123 See id.
124 Case No. 7615, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 24, OEA/ser.L/V/II.66, doc.10 rev. 1
(1985).
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(ICCPR).125 There, Canadian residents alleged that radioactive
waste that remained after the government conducted a cleanup
constituted serious risks to health in violation to Article 6 of the
Covenant. Although the Committee dismissed the case on juris-
dictional issues, it stated that the case "raised serious issues
with regard to the obligation of States parties to protect human
life ",126
The European Commission of Human Rights (ECHR) up-
held the rights of the victim in Lopez Ostra v. Spain.127 There,
the plaintiff suffered from emissions from a waste treatment
plant built on municipal property with a government subsidy
just twelve metres from her home. The plaintiff filed com-
plaints based on violations of fundamental rights under the
Spanish constitution, but was afforded no relief.-12 Lopez Ostra
then applied to the ECHR stating that local authorities' inac-
tion violated her rights under the European Convention of
Human Rights. 129 The Commission found a violation of Art. 8
(protection of private life and family), but rejected an Art. 3
claim (prohibition against torture and inhuman and degrading
treatment).130 In its decision, the ECHR explained that States
have both a positive duty to take measures to secure rights
under Art. 8, and a negative duty to stop official interference. 131
Spain was held liable for four million pesetas in damages and
over one million pesetas for costs and expenses. 13 2
These decisions indicate that international human rights
tribunals are moving in the direction of applying human rights
principles for remedies in cases involving environmental harm.
Despite these decisions, the standard view is that an indepen-
125 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 6(1).
126 See Taylor, supra note 107, at 341 (citing E.H.P. Canada, No. 67/1980, in 2
Selected Decisions of the Human Rights Commission Under the Optional Protocol
20 (1990)).
127 Lopez Ostra v. Spain, 20 E.H.R.R. 277 (1995).
128 See id.
129 See id.
130 In its finding that Spain violated the Convention, the Commission stated
"depite the margin of appreciation left to the respondent State, the Court considers
that the State did not succeed in striking a fair balance between the interest of the
town's economic well-being ... and the applicant's effective enjoyment of her right
to respect for her home and her private and family life."
131 See id.
132 Lopez Ostra v. Spain, 20 E.H.R.R. 277 (1995).
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dent right to the environment has not yet crystallized into cus-
tomary international law.133
While human rights law can play an essential role in the
protection of individuals from a government's political
processes,134 it does have certain limitations: (i) enforcement ca-
pabilities are generally limited to making recommendations;
and (ii) international human rights bodies ignore the role of
non-state actors. Thus, human rights law must be viewed as
only one aspect of bringing violations to light and applying pub-
lic pressure to governments.1 35
IV. CONCLUSION
The issues raised concerning the Huaorani's plight due to
oil exploitation are just one example of numerous injustices by
transnational corporations being repeated around the world.
Unquestionably, oil development operations in the Amazonian
rainforest threaten the very existence of the Huaorani people,
and demonstrate the strong link between environmental degra-
dation and human rights concerns. In the case of the Huaorani
people, effective access to justice is near impossible. Most
Huaorani have no knowledge or understanding of Ecuadoran
laws and the legal system, do not speak the language in which
the laws are written, and have different values from other
Ecuadorans.1 36 In addition, most indigenous groups lack the fi-
nancial resources to pursue long-term litigation against mul-
tinational companies and governmental bodies.
How should developing countries balance the need for for-
eign investment with human rights violations and obligations
to the environment? What recourse do indigenous peoples and
other affected individuals have when the government has ne-
glected their interests? Should host countries bear the burden
of regulation and oversight of TNCs, when potential effects on
humans and the environment violate international human
rights norms?
TNCs do not fit into traditional roles of international law
because they are not states or international organizations.
133 See Taylor, supra note 107, at 345.
134 See Shelton, supra note 107, at 107.
135 See Rights Violations, supra note 21, at 29.
136 See Fabra, supra note 1.
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Therefore, there is no international court that can exercise ju-
risdiction in cases involving corporations. 137 Yet, TNC's wield
more wealth and power than many developing countries. In rec-
ognition that international law is expanding to include the pri-
vate sector, dispute settlement mechanisms of human rights
tribunals should be amended to allow for the inclusion of claims
against multinational companies. In addition, global environ-
mental standards should be required and adopted by TNCs. It
is hypocritical that one standard should apply for citizens of in-
dustrialized countries, while lesser standards are applied to
those in developing countries.
The adoption of an international treaty on the human right
to a healthy environment would demonstrate that environmen-
tal human rights have reached the status of customary interna-
tional law. The creation of a treaty that sets forth the right to a
healthy environment would provide minimum international
standards and legitimize international supervision of a state's
domestic policies. In addition, it would provide individuals with
environmentally related claims much needed access to human
rights forums such as the United Nations Human Rights Com-
mittee, and the European Committee on Human Rights.
If the human right to a healthy environment was recog-
nized as customary international law, states would be obliged to
take certain measures to protect its citizens from detrimental
development activities of transnational corporations. Such obli-
gations would exist regardless of domestic laws or the ratifica-
tion of an international treaty that espoused such rights.
Where states choose to ignore their obligations under custom-
ary international law, the international community could apply
137 There is, however, emerging recognition of the private sector's role in inter-
national law. Some international tribunals can exercise jurisdiction over the pri-
vate sector in disputes falling within the auspices of a convention. See The
International Seabed Authority of the Law of the Sea Convention, U.N. Doc. A/52/
260, Ann. (July 28, 1997) reprinted at 36 I.L.M. 1492 (1997). See also Rules of
Procedure for the Institution of Conciliation and Arbitration Proceedings, The In-
ternational Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), Rule 1
(1966) which places corporations on par with states. The rules are available at
<http://www.asser.nl/icalicsid/htm> (last visited June 19, 2000). The Kyoto Proto-
col is the first international environmental treaty in which the private sector is
expected to play a significant role, through the Clean Development Mechanism
and flexible trading regimes. See Peggy Kalas, Alexia Hering, Dispute Resolution
Under the Kyoto Protocol, 27 Ecol. L.Q. 53 (2000).
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universal standards to hold transnational corporations account-
able. In addition, violations of the human right to a healthy
environment would clearly fall within the purview of the ATCA
as a violation of the law of nations.
In the absence of adequate enforcement of domestic laws by
Ecuador, a universal code of conduct, or an international treaty
that extends justiciable environmental rights to the individual,
there exists no adequate recourse for the Huaorani, or other
peoples and environments at risk. Unless U.S. courts are will-
ing to open their doors to foreign plaintiffs, U.S. multinational
corporations will have no incentive to discontinue their detri-
mental operations in developing countries whose need for for-
eign investment appear greater than their interest in
preserving a healthy environment for their citizens. 138 Histori-
cally, U.S. courts have been all too willing to dismiss such cases
on the basis of forum non conveniens. The decision in Jota by
the District Court on remand is awaited, as it may provide hope
for victims of environmentally abusive practices of TNCs that
such conduct may be found violative of international legal
norms. While class action litigation may not be a panacea for
the grievances of victims of human rights violations and may
raise additional concerns (e.g., who defines the class, who has
authority to speak for the class) it is the only tool available at
present with the potential to provide at least some type of rem-
edy to victims, and prod multinational actors into responsible
actions.
138 See Foreign Plaintiffs, supra note 53, at 522.
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